Good points. When these things are so obvious to fans and yet ownership doesn't recognize them, or does and refuses to act on them, then there is reason for serious concern for the future of the franchise.
As soon as Picollo gave Jordan Lyles 17 million to eat innings for a 100 loss team he should have been fired because that was the epitome of a DMGM move and showed he wasn't different enough from his boss of 17 years to move the organization forward.
I haven't seen the smallest sign that John Sherman cares about winning. His comment that it wasnt time to spend money on salary should be repeated back to him each time he brings up the new stadium. The decision to draft players who will sign for less is without question a major reason this organization stinks. But it allows JJ to sign the cheapest talent available, then justify this season of "evaulation/ humiliation" rather than sign major leaguers. It's all about spending less and making more. The new stadium won't be buillt in the best interests of Kansas City. It will be the most lucrative design for John Sherman. He's not being a good steward of this historic franchise, ensuring it stays in KC. If so, he would care about the on field product and the fans of this dreadful product. I truly believe he bought this team with the idea to hold KC for ransom, and threaten to move the team to Las Vegas. Then Oakland beat him to the punch.
Regarding the draft, it's not a matter of going cheap. Teams are allotted a budget based on a dollar value for each pick they have. The Royals are still spending the virtual entirety of their draft budget. On a year where they go under slot on a first round pick like Mozzicato or Dozier, they're spreading that money around on picks in rounds two through 10, coaxing preps out of college commitments (Kudrna) or guys whose stock have fallen who might opt to go back for their senior years to reestablish higher value (Manaea).
The money is still getting spent, so it's not a matter of cheaping out. It's a strategic move if you think you can snag a guy who is way more valuable than the next pick you have. In the case of Dozier and Manaea, it was arguably successful.
A better example of this strategy working is when the Astros took Carlos Correa 1:1 overall. He was generally seen as more of the 5th or 6th best overall prospect for that draft class, but the Astros viewed him more highly and signed Correa for roughly $2MM under slot, which meant they could go way over slot on Lance McCullers Jr and Rio Ruiz. Their assessment of Correa was correct, as he's been 8.9 rWAR better than the next best first round pick, Corey Seager, who was taken 18th overall.
So there is a scenario in which this strategy can work. I think the Pirates' and Padres' 2021 drafts are another instance in which that sort of chicanery can work. The Pirates 1:1 pick Henry Davis signed under slot for less than the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th picks signed, and then they used that extra money in their draft budget to sign Anthony Solometo and Bubba Chandler. The Padres took Jackson Merrill for about $700K under slot and used most of that money to sign James Wood for more than Merrill signed for but less than Merrill's slot allotment was for. Wood and Merrill are both top 10 prospects two years later. Of course, the Royals did the same damn thing in 2021 WITH HIGHER PICKS THAN SAN DIEGO and have virtually nothing to show for it, which means that this comes down to scouting (and player development).
The strategy isn't necessarily flawed if your scouting team has identified a prospect who's been undervalued by the industry, making them a good bet to outperform their signing bonus demands while also letting you sign a guy with your next pick whose demands are pricing him out of other clubs' draft budgets. The Royals are not the team who has proven able to do this.
Good points. When these things are so obvious to fans and yet ownership doesn't recognize them, or does and refuses to act on them, then there is reason for serious concern for the future of the franchise.
For sure.
As soon as Picollo gave Jordan Lyles 17 million to eat innings for a 100 loss team he should have been fired because that was the epitome of a DMGM move and showed he wasn't different enough from his boss of 17 years to move the organization forward.
No argument here.
I haven't seen the smallest sign that John Sherman cares about winning. His comment that it wasnt time to spend money on salary should be repeated back to him each time he brings up the new stadium. The decision to draft players who will sign for less is without question a major reason this organization stinks. But it allows JJ to sign the cheapest talent available, then justify this season of "evaulation/ humiliation" rather than sign major leaguers. It's all about spending less and making more. The new stadium won't be buillt in the best interests of Kansas City. It will be the most lucrative design for John Sherman. He's not being a good steward of this historic franchise, ensuring it stays in KC. If so, he would care about the on field product and the fans of this dreadful product. I truly believe he bought this team with the idea to hold KC for ransom, and threaten to move the team to Las Vegas. Then Oakland beat him to the punch.
Regarding the draft, it's not a matter of going cheap. Teams are allotted a budget based on a dollar value for each pick they have. The Royals are still spending the virtual entirety of their draft budget. On a year where they go under slot on a first round pick like Mozzicato or Dozier, they're spreading that money around on picks in rounds two through 10, coaxing preps out of college commitments (Kudrna) or guys whose stock have fallen who might opt to go back for their senior years to reestablish higher value (Manaea).
The money is still getting spent, so it's not a matter of cheaping out. It's a strategic move if you think you can snag a guy who is way more valuable than the next pick you have. In the case of Dozier and Manaea, it was arguably successful.
A better example of this strategy working is when the Astros took Carlos Correa 1:1 overall. He was generally seen as more of the 5th or 6th best overall prospect for that draft class, but the Astros viewed him more highly and signed Correa for roughly $2MM under slot, which meant they could go way over slot on Lance McCullers Jr and Rio Ruiz. Their assessment of Correa was correct, as he's been 8.9 rWAR better than the next best first round pick, Corey Seager, who was taken 18th overall.
So there is a scenario in which this strategy can work. I think the Pirates' and Padres' 2021 drafts are another instance in which that sort of chicanery can work. The Pirates 1:1 pick Henry Davis signed under slot for less than the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th picks signed, and then they used that extra money in their draft budget to sign Anthony Solometo and Bubba Chandler. The Padres took Jackson Merrill for about $700K under slot and used most of that money to sign James Wood for more than Merrill signed for but less than Merrill's slot allotment was for. Wood and Merrill are both top 10 prospects two years later. Of course, the Royals did the same damn thing in 2021 WITH HIGHER PICKS THAN SAN DIEGO and have virtually nothing to show for it, which means that this comes down to scouting (and player development).
The strategy isn't necessarily flawed if your scouting team has identified a prospect who's been undervalued by the industry, making them a good bet to outperform their signing bonus demands while also letting you sign a guy with your next pick whose demands are pricing him out of other clubs' draft budgets. The Royals are not the team who has proven able to do this.